Arguments for and against abortion make up one of the most emotive debates currently plaguing humanity. On the one side, pro-choice supporters argue that procuring an abortion remains the sole decision of the woman. On the other hand, pro-life supporters see the fetus as a new life that requires an equal chance to develop fully. Life, as it is, begins at conception, and while some life-threatening circumstances may warrant abortion, the sanctity of life morally and judicially calls for the protection and preservation of life.
One of the most important arguments against abortion centers on life. The fetus is life in itself given that it harbors all the characteristics of a living cell. Only living cells have the capacity to multiply and grow: characteristics readily exhibited by fetuses (Rini 353). The sanctity of life and all the moral status that come with the life of both infants and adults, therefore, apply to the fetus. Life essentially begins at conception, giving the fetus all the moral privileges and rights to any live individual (Seipel 518). Abortion, therefore, denies the fetus this right, and in so doing degenerates into a crime of murder by ending a life. By conception, the fetus naturally becomes a human being, who then has moral standing and the right to enjoy all the rights and privileges that come with their existence and humans.
Worth noting is that as an individual, the fetus has massive potential. Seipel argues that the fetus has the potential to be rational and self-aware, and should, therefore, get the chance to reach the potential (Meyers 461; Seipel 518). Biologically, the fetus and the mother are separate individuals, and while the fetus’s attachment to the mother is through the placenta and umbilical cord, they remain separate. The separation between the to is so distinct that any mixture of blood between the two can be fatal to both. As an individual, thus, the fetus has a right to grow and express their views, reach their full potential without these aspirations necessarily cut short by abortion.
Pro-choice supporters, on the other hand, argue that abortion should be a choice for women who may not have the mean to take care of the baby, have complications, or got pregnant through traumatic circumstances such as rape or incest. Moreover, pro-choice supporter additionally argue that the infant is not yet a person since a moral person is one who can attribute his/her existence to some basic value, whose deprivation would represent a loss to him/her (Rini 354). The argument here is that fetuses cannot attribute their existence to any value, essentially negating their claim to being moral persons. While it is given that some women get pregnant through traumatic experiences, worth noting is the life of the fetus and the potential it holds. Such recognition does not intend to diminish the severity of the traumatic experience, but rather protect the sanctity of life
While pro-choice supporters argue for abortion, the fact that it ends life with a future makes it morally and judicially wrong. Abortion robs the fetus of life with infinite possibilities. While it is given that some circumstances may oblige abortion, procuring it just because one has a choice is an abuse to the sanctity of life, which requires protection at all costs.
Work cited
Meyers, Christopher D. “Abortion, the Golden Rule, and the Indeterminacy of Potential Persons.” Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 39, no. 3-4, 2005, pp. 459-473. ProQuest, https://search.proquest.com/docview/203911109?accountid=1611, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-005-1569-6.
Rini, Regina A. “Of Course the Baby should Live: Against ‘After-Birth Abortion’.” Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 39, no. 5, 2013, pp. 353. ProQuest, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1781096283?accountid=1611, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2012-100640.
Seipel, Peter. “Is there Sufficient Common Ground to Resolve the Abortion Debate?” Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 48, no. 3, 2014, pp. 517-531. ProQuest, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1552798166?accountid=1611, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9436-y.v