Sample Aviation Paper on AF 447

None CRQ 5

AF 447


An organizational influence factor that led to the accident was the poor design of the cockpit. It was designed in a manner that the Pilot Not Flying could not have a view of the actions taken by the Pilot Flying. Arguably, with a proper design of the cockpit, there could be proper communication between the pilots, and thus, the accident could have been prevented.


The unsafe supervision factor that led to the accident is that Air France did not modify, replace, or repair faulty pitot tubes of the aircraft despite reports from crews. The accident could have been prevented had modification or repair of the faulty pitot tubes been done before the flight.


One of the precondition for Unsafe Act factors that led to the accident was thee poor communication between the pilots. Upon the detection of a problem, the flying pilot tried to contact the Captain for help, but the latter took time to respond, forcing the flying pilot to take an inaccurate action. A proper communication between the Captain and the flying pilot could have prevented the accident.


An unsafe act factor that led to the accident was the decision errors made by the flying pilot. His decision to make the aircraft climb once turbulence was detected was wrong, and this in turn, resulted in confusion and the accident in the long run. Had he stuck to the rules in place, his poor decision making that led to the accident could not have been experienced.


In the real sense, despite the efforts and attempts to enhance aircraft safety, two factors as seen in AF 447 accident come as a surprise. One factor is that aviation companies choose to ignore important perspectives such as repairing and maintaining their aircraft. The second surprising factor is that there is miscommunication between pilots in aircraft, and this must have been one of the key contributors to the AF 447 accident.


In the real sense, addition of advanced technology cannot make flying safer unless effective training is given to persons who with the responsibility of dealing with the technology. There is a possibility that having advanced technology without proper training of pilots for the use of the same will jeopardize flight safety.


Airlines have the responsibility of training pilots and other flight attendance on how to deal with or handle various technological equipments in aircraft. As such, disagreement with the statement made by the last person to talk on the video is imminent. Training ensures that pilots and other crew members are aware of how to handle complications, and through this, they can prevent accidents.


There is a significant difference between the actions of the flight crew of Qantas 32 and those of AF 447. In the former, the flight crew was in constant communication and made decisions together, and thus, possible decision errors were avoided. In the latter, there was poor communication between the flight crew, and this resulted in decision errors that caused the accident in the long run.

Qantas 32


An organizational influence factor that contributed to the accident was the faulty engines manufactured and sold to Airbus by Rolls-Royce holdings. There is no doubt that without faulty engines, the incident could have been prevented.


An unsafe supervision factor that contributed to the incident was the failure of Rolls-Royce to inspect its engines before selling to Airbus, which was the manufacture of the Qantas 32 aircraft. Effective supervision or inspection of the same could have prevented the occurrence of the incident.


The precondition for unsafe act factor that contributed to the incident or accident was technological upsets. In this case, the technological problem was how the engine of AF 447 aircraft was manufactured.


The unsafe act factor that contributed to the accident was the routine violation, in which aviation authorities tolerate the fact that companies, such as Rolls-Royce, manufacture and distribute faulty aircraft engines. Obviously, strictness from aviation authorities could have prevented the faultiness of AF 447 aircraft’s engine, and this could have prevented the incident.


A surprising factor when it comes to aircraft safety or maintenance is that faulty are equipment, which jeopardize aircraft safety are used in the manufacture of aircraft. Besides, it is surprising that airlines conduct little or no inspection of aircraft before the release of flights. Unless these two factors are addressed, aircraft safety and maintenance will forever be in jeopardy.


The role of airmanship and technology in the Qantas 32 incident cannot be ignored. It should be noted that the pilots used the available technology and their flight skills to find a way of resolving the problem at hand, something which was not done by the pilots of AF 447.